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I. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) and the Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, § 3, this 
Court has jurisdiction over the present appeal. 
IL STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Notwithstanding Jorgensen 5s oblique statement of issues, the core issue is whether 
the Trial Court's December 12, 2001 Order (Appendix, Ex. C) correctly interpreted the 
November 11, 2000 Order (Appendix, Ex. A) by requiring Jorgensen to pay $25 per sheep 
per day as a fine for allowing his sheep to trespass on Mower's land. Thus, Jorgensen's 
appeal seeks to have this Court review the Trial Court's interpretation of the stipulated 
November 22,2000 Order based on extrinsic evidence about the fairness of the Trial 
Court's interpretation. 
Stipulations are essentially inter partes contracts. Deseret Sav. Bank v. Walker, 2 
P.2d 609, 614 (Utah 1931). Thus, "[determining the meaning of a contract by extrinsic 
evidence generally presents questions of fact for the trier of fact, whose findings we 
review deferentially." Interwest Const, v. Palmer. 923 P.2d 1350, 1359 (Utah 1996) 
(emphasis added). "Different standards of review apply in an appeal involving the 
interpretation of a contract. 'Whether an ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law 
which we review for correctness.' [Citation omitted]. 'Questions of intent as determined 
by extrinsic evidence are questions of fact to be decided by the trier of fact and are 
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subject to the fclearly erroneous1 standard of review'" Sprouse v. Jager, 806 P.2d 219, 
221-22 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Because the core issue is what did the parties intend in their stipulations to the two 
orders in question, the standard of review of the Trial Court's decisions is the "clearly 
erroneous" standard, not the de novo standard suggested in Jorgensen's Statement of 
Issues. 
ffl. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This dispute involves two neighbors of large tracks of land in Sanpeete County. 
Because Jorgensen allowing his sheep to trespass onto Mower's land, Mower filed the 
underlying action seeking to enjoin such trespasses. The injunction was granted, but did not 
stop Jorgensen for allowing his sheep to repeatedly trespass onto Mower's land. 
After moving the Trial Court for the first of four orders to show cause, the parties 
stipulated to the November 22, 2000 Order, and then later to the December 12,2001 
Order, that provided a fine of $25 per-sheep-per-day to deter Jorgensen from allowing his 
sheep to trespass on Mower's land. 
Jorgensen's appeal seeks to have this Court invalidate the Trial Court's December 
12, 2001 Order by reinterpreting the November 22, 2000 Order to require only a $25 per-
day fine rather than a $25 per-sheep-per-day fine. 
B. Proceedings Below 
Mower instituted the underlying action by filing a Verified Complaint on November 
10,1998 claiming trespass and requesting injunctive relief. [R at 1.] Four months later, 
due to repeated trespasses onto his land by Jorgensen's sheep, Mower filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction. [R at 22.] On April 14, 1999, the Trial Court entered an order 
granting Mower's motion. [R at 67.] 
The sheep trespasses continued, precipitating Mower's July 13, 1999 Petition for 
Order to Show Cause. [R at 107.] Based upon a stipulation by the parties, the Trial Court 
signed and entered its November 22, 2000 Order. [R at 198.] 
The sheep trespasses still continued. Mower thus filed another Motion for Order to 
Show Cause on July 11,2001, seeking damages of $3,675 based on a $25 per-sheep-per-
dayfme. [R at 204, 206-07.] On December 12,2001, the Trial Court signed an order 
granting Mower's July 11th motion [R at 236], and on December 26,2001, the Trial Court 
signed a judgment in favor of Mower and against Jorgensen in the amount of $3,675. [R at 
246; see, Appendix, Ex. D.] That same day, Jorgensen belatedly filed an objection to said 
judgment [R at 239-240], which the Trial Court denied on January 16, 2002. [R at 155.] 
Nine months later, on September 23,2002, Jorgensen filed his Motion to Vacate 
and Set Aside Judgment [R at 260], which the Trial Court denied on December 6, 2002 as 
untimely. [Rat296.] 
The sheep trespasses, however, continued. Mower filed yet another Motion for 
Order to Show Cause on June 15, 2004 regarding trespasses on his land by Jorgensen's 
sheep. [R at 300.] The Trial Court granted said motion on November 18, 2004, and held 
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that the November 22, 2000 and December 12, 2001 orders were stipulated orders. [R at 
374.] The Trial Court then entered a judgment in favor of Mower and against Jorgensen on 
December 6, 2004 for the recent trespass. [R at 380.] In response, Jorgensen filed a Rule 
59 motion to alter or amend the December 6th Judgment on December 15, 2004 [R at 383], 
which, other than re-calculating the amount owed in the Judgment, was denied by the Trial 
Court's February 9, 2005 memorandum decision. [R at 400.] 
Jorgensen filed his Notice of Appeal on March 4, 2005. 
C. Material Facts 
Facts Re: The Two Stipulated Orders 
1. Based on Mower's July 13,1999 Petition for Order to Show Cause, the Trial 
Court entered an order on November 22, 2000 (November 22, 2000 Order) which 
provides, among other things, a $25 "per day fee for sheep" that trespass on Mower's land. 
[Rat 198.] 
2. The November 22, 2000 Order was a stipulated order based on the following: 
a. According to the minutes of the August 8, 1999 hearing on Mower's order 
to show cause petition, counsel for Jorgensen stipulated to preventing Jorgensen's sheep 
from trespassing onto Mower's land until April 1,2000. [R at 136.] 
b. Again, at a hearing on December 1, 1999, the parties orally stipulated to a 
settlement of their dispute. [R at 198.] The Trial Court memorialized the parties' 
vii 
settlement in its November 22, 2000 Order. [Id.] 
c. The November 22, 2000 Order itself states, "A settlement was orally 
agreed upon by both parties at a hearing before this Court on the 1st day of December, 
1999." [Rat 198.] 
3. The sheep trespasses still continued. Mower thus filed another Motion for Order 
to Show Cause on July 11, 2001, seeking damages of $3,675 based on a $25 per-sheep-
per-day fine. [R at 204, 206-07.] 
4. As a result, the Trial Court entered an order on December 12, 2001 (December 
12,2001 Order) requiring Jorgensen to pay a fine of $25 per-sheep-per-day to Mower 
which resulted in a $3,675 Judgment, dated December 26, 2001, against Jorgensen. [R at 
236.] 
5. The December 12,2001 Order was also a stipulated order based on the 
following: 
a. At the October 17, 2001 evidentiary hearing on the July 11, 2001 Motion 
for Order to Show Cause, Jorgensen's then-counsel agreed that the previous November 22, 
2000 Order provided for a fine of $25 per sheep per day. [R at 269.] 
b. Specifically, at the October 17th hearing, the Trial Court asked Jorgensen's 
then-attorney: "Is there an order in the file, Mr. Harmon, that says pay $25.00 per sheep per 
day?" Jorgensen's attorney responded unequivocally, "Yes." [R at 453, 7:25-8:2; see, 
excerpt in Appendix, Ex. B] 
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c. Jorgensen himself was even present at the October 17, 2001 hearing. [R 
at 401.] 
d. The December 12, 2001 Order itself states, "based upon the affidavits 
submitted Plaintiff and the stipulation of the parties at the October 17, 2001 hearing . . . " [R 
at 237.] 
6. In its November 17, 2004 Order on Order to Show Cause, the Trial Court stated, 
"The orders of November 20, 2000, and December 12, 2001 were stipulated orders." [R at 
375.] 
7. Finally, the Trial Court stated in its February 4, 2005 Memorandum Decision 
Regarding Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, "In my opinion, the 'per sheep per day' 
decision was made months ago and is reflected in the December 12, 2001 order. I believe 
the decision was made by stipulation of the parties and was discussed specifically at a court 
hearing in Manti where Mr. Jorgensen and his attorney Milt Harmon were present. I recall 
approving the stipulation at that hearing which was held before November, 2000.*" [R at 
401.] 
Facts Re: Jorgensen's Nearly One-Year Delay in Disputing the $25-Per-Sheep-Per~ 
Day Stipulation 
8. Notwithstanding Jorgensen5s October 17, 2001 in-court stipulation to the $25-
per-sheep-per-day fine, he did not dispute this stipulation until 13 months later when he 
filed his November 23, 2002 Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Judgment. [R at 260.] 
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9. The Trial Court denied said motion as untimely on December 6, 2002. [R at 
296.] 
10. Although Jorgensen belatedly filed (on December 26, 2001) an objection to the 
proposed judgment which the Trial Court signed and entered on December 26, 2001, said 
objection asserted no argument disputing the $25 per-sheep-per-day stipulation or fine by 
which the Trial Court awarded $3,675 to Mower in the December 26, 2001 Judgment. [R 
at 239-240.] 
11. The Trial Court denied said objection on January 16,2002 as being untimely. 
[Rat 155.] 
Facts Re: The Repeated Trespasses of Jorgensen5s Sheep onto Mower's Land 
12. Repeated trespasses onto Mower's land by Jorgensen's sheep precipitated 
Mower's underlying Verified Complaint, which sought injunctive relief. [R at 1.] 
13. Four months later, due to further trespasses, Mower filed a motion for 
preliminary injunction [R at 22], which the Trial Court granted on April 14, 1999. [R at 67.] 
14. Because of further sheep trespasses, Mower filed a July 13, 1999 Petition for 
Order to Show Cause [R at 107], which resulted in the stipulated November 22, 2000 
Order. [Rat 198.] 
15. Yet further sheep trespasses prompted Mower's July 11,2001 Motion for 
Order to Show Cause [R at 204], which resulted in the stipulated December 12, 2001 
Order. [Rat236.] 
x 
16. Mower filed another Motion for Order to Show Cause on June 15, 2004 [R at 
300], which resulted in the November 18, 2004 Order. [R at 374.] 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Jorgensen's appeal should be denied for four reasons. First, the Trial Court's 
February 4, 2005 decision denying Jorgensen's Rule 59 motion is not the proper order to 
be appealed. Instead, Jorgensen should have appealed the December 26,2001 Judgment (or 
December 12, 2001 Order) which clearly articulated the $25 per-sheep-per-day fine which 
is the root of Jorgensen's appeal. Thus, Jorgensen's appeal is untimely for failure to file an 
appeal within 30 days of said judgment or order. 
Second, although Jorgensen relies on U.C.A. § 4-25-08 in support of his claim that 
any fine should be related to actual damages incurred by Mower, said statute is inapplicable 
to this action because the two orders in question which provide the $25 per-sheep-per-day 
fine - the November 22, 2000 and December 12, 2001 orders - were stipulated to by 
Jorgensen. 
Third, the law of the case doctrine properly applies to the November 22, 2000 and 
December 12, 2001 orders, thereby making the Court's clarification of the $25 per-sheep-
per-day fine in the December 12, 2001 the law of the case. 
Finally, either because of waiver or laches, Jorgensen should be barred from 
disputing the November 11, 2000 and December 12, 2001 orders. 
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S FEBRUARY 4, 2005 DECISION DENYING 
JORGENSEN'S RULE 59 MOTION IS NOT THE PROPER ORDER TO BE 
APPEALED; JORGENSEN SHOULD HAVE APPEALED THE DECEMBER 
26, 2001 JUDGMENT 
According to Jorgensen's Notice of Appeal, he appeals the Trial Court's February 4, 
2005 Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. This 
memorandum decision stems from the Trial Court's November 17,2004 Order on Order to 
Show Cause and corresponding December 1,2004 Judgment. [R at 401.] Said order and 
judgment are based on Mower's June 15, 2004 Motion for Order to Show Cause which 
resulted in the trial court's June 15, 2004 Order to Show Cause. [R at 303-04.] Thus, 
Mower's June 15,2004 Motion for Order to Show Cause culminated in the November 17, 
2004 Order on Order to Show Cause [R at 374] and December 1,2004 Judgment. [R at 
380,401.] 
This was the same pattern with Mower's earlier motion for order to show cause 
which culminated in the December 12, 2001 Order. Specifically, Mower filed a Motion 
for Order to Show Cause upon which the Trial Court issued an Order to Show Cause on 
August 28, 2001 [R at 236], which culminated in the December 12,2001 Order and the 
December 26, 2001 Judgment. [R at 246.] 
This begs the question: why didn't Jorgensen appeal the December 25, 2001 
Judgment (or December 12,2001 Order)? This question resonates even louder in 
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Jorgensen's appeal which is basically an indictment of the November 22, 2000 and 
December 12, 2001 orders. In fact, throughout Jorgensen's appeal brief, he repeatedly 
questions the Trial Court's December 12, 2001 Order (which interprets the November 22, 
2000 Order), and then argues repeatedly for a re-interpretation of the November 22, 2000 
Order's $25~per-day fee. Yet Jorgensen waited over three years, until his March 11,2005 
Notice of Appeal, to appeal the Trial Court's December 12, 2001 interpretation of its 
November 22, 2000 Order.1 
Jorgensen cannot dispute the fact that there is nothing different between the 
December 12, 2001 Order/December 26, 2001 Judgment and the November 17, 2004 
Order/December 1, 2004 Judgment (the latter of which Jorgensen appealed). Just as 
Mower received an order and judgment in 2001, he did again in 2004. Nothing has made 
the 2004 order and judgment different such that Jorgensen's appeal rights somehow 
became ripe with the 2004 order and judgment.2 
1
 Jorgensen has consistently been tardy in filing objections and motions. He did not 
file an objection to the proposed judgment on the December 12, 2001 Order until 
December 26, 2001 - the day the Trial Court signed the proposed judgment. [R at 239.] 
Jorgensen was again dilatory in filing his September 23, 2002 Motion to Vacate and Set 
Aside Judgment which sought to set aside the December 26, 2001 Judgment. [R at 260.] 
2
 Jorgensen may argue that the parties stipulated on or about February 7, 2003 to a 
satisfaction and vacation of the December 26, 2001 Judgment. Even so, that satisfaction 
did not occur until over one year after the December 26, 2001 Judgment. Further, said 
satisfaction did not dissolve the December 12, 2001 Order upon which said judgment was 
based. In other words, even if the December 26, 2001 Judgment was satisfied, the 
December 12, 2001 Order still remained in full force and effect. 
2 
Thus, to properly appeal the Trial Court's December 12, 2001 interpretation of its 
November 11, 2000 Order, Jorgensen should have filed his Notice of Appeal within 30 
days of the December 26, 2001 Judgment. Because he filed his March 4, 2005 Notice of 
Appeal years after the December 26, 2001 Judgment, Jorgensen's current appeal is not 
timely and should thus be dismissed. 
B. U.C.A. § 4-25-08 IS INAPPLICABLE TO THIS ACTION BECAUSE THE 
ORDERS IN QUESTION - THE NOVEMBER 22, 2000 AND DECEMBER 12, 
2001 ORDERS - WERE STIPULATED TO BY JORGENSEN 
Jorgensen argues that damages for trespassing animals are limited to the actual 
damage they cause based on U.C.A. § 4-25-08 (trespassing animals statute). This argument, 
however, overlooks and ignores the two stipulated orders at issue herein - the November 
22,2000 and December 12,2001 orders. 
Utah law on stipulations is clear. "[A stipulation] has all the binding effect of 
findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court upon the evidence. The rationale 
is that the stipulation constitutes an agreement of the parties that all the facts necessary to 
support i t . . . pre-existed and would be sustained by available evidence, had not the 
agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking of evidence." Davis v. Davis, 29 P.3d 
676, 680 (Utah App. 2001); State v. Seventy-Three Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars 
United States. 31 P.3d 514, 516 (Utah 2001) (same). "An issue determined by stipulation 
rather than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if the parties manifested an 
intention to that effect" Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214,1224 
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(Utah 2000). "[0]rdinarily, courts are bound by stipulations between parties." Adkins v. 
Uncle Barfs, Inc., 1 P.3d 528, 536 (Utah 2000) (citation omitted). In DLB Collection 
Trust bv Helgesen & Waterfall v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 595 (Utah App. 1995), the court 
further elaborated on stipulations: 
It is settled that stipulations are conclusive and binding on the parties, unless good 
cause is shown for relief. [Citation omitted]. This court 'cannot overlook or 
disregard stipulations which are absolute and unequivocal. Stipulations of attorneys 
may not be disregarded or set aside at will.' [Citation omitted]. We find that having 
stipulated to the trial court's actions, the Estate may not now complain about them 
on appeal. [Citations omitted]. 
In City of Logan v. Utah Power & Light Co., 796 P.2d 697, 701 (Utah 1990), the parties 
stipulated to the damages "they thought UP & L would be entitled to under several legal 
theories." The City of Logan court then explained (with emphasis added): 
The record does not permit us to determine whether the legal and factual premises 
upon which that [damages] figure is based are congruent with the constitutional 
requirements of article I, section 22. However, because the parties did stipulate 
to this amount, they are bound and the trial court should enter judgment against 
Logan for that amount if it proceeds or has proceeded with the ouster of UP & L 
from its territorial limits. 
In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the two orders in question were stipulated. The 
November 22,2000 order states, "A settlement was orally agreed upon by both parties at a 
hearing before this Court on the 1st day of December, 1999." [R at 198.] The December 
12, 2001 Order similarly states, "based upon the affidavits submitted Plaintiff and the 
stipulation of the parties at the October 17, 2001 hearing . . ." [R at 237.] In its November 
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17, 2004 Order on Order to Show Cause, the Trial Court stated, "The orders of November 
20, 2000, and December 12, 2001 were stipulated orders." [R at 375.] Finally, the Trial 
Court stated in its February 4, 2005 Memorandum Decision Regarding Motion to Alter or 
Amend Judgment, "In my opinion, the 'per sheep per day' decision was made months ago 
and is reflected in the December 12, 2001 order. I believe the decision was made by 
stipulation of the parties and was discussed specifically at a court hearing in Manti where 
Mr. Jorgensen and his attorney Milt Harmon were present. I recall approving the 
stipulation at that hearing which was held before November, 2000." [R at 401.] 
Thus, based on the host of caselaw cited above, the stipulations that resulted in the 
November 22, 2000 and December 12, 2001 orders are binding and enforceable. Further, 
as was the case in City of Logan, the parties have in effect stipulated to damages - i.e. $25 
per sheep per day. Such a stipulation is perfectly proper and enforceable according to the 
above caselaw. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RELIED ON THE PARTIES5 IN-COURT 
REPRESENTATIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
Jorgensen next argues on appeal that Mower and the Trial Court improperly relied 
on the statement by Jorgensen's attorney at the October 17, 2001 hearing for establishing 
the $25-per-sheep-per-day fine. Specifically, Jorgensen attempts to distance himself from 
his attorney's October 17, 2001 in-court stipulation/representation by stating that the Trial 
Court's question at the October 17, 2001 hearing to his attorney was whether a $25-per-
5 
sheep-per-day order existed, not whether that was how Jorgensen's attorney interpreted the 
November 22nd order. 
Jorgensen's argument is absurd. Clearly, had Jorgensen's attorney interpreted his 
representation/stipulation and the November 22, 2000 and December 12, 2001 orders as 
Jorgensen now does (i.e. $25-per-day only), then his attorney would not have acknowledged 
that there was a $25-per-sheep-per-day order in the file at the October 17, 2001 hearing. 
Instead, Jorgensen's attorney would have objected at the October 17th hearing to such an 
interpretation of the November 22, 2000 Order, or at the least stated his own interpretation 
to the November 22nd Order. 
Furthermore, Jorgensen himself was in court at the October 17, 2001 evidentiary 
hearing [R at 401], and thus presumably heard his attorney make the 
stipulation/representation in question without correcting his attorney before the conclusion 
of said hearing. 
The present appeal is thus simply Jorgensen's attempt to second-guess his attorney's 
October 17, 2001 representation and interpretation of the November 22, 2000 Order. 
Jorgensen argues that his current interpretation of the November 22,2000 Order should 
trump his October 17, 2001 interpretation of the November 22nd Order simply because he 
now views the December 12,2001 Order as unfair. 
Further, the Trial Court did not need to re-interpret the November 22, 2000 Order 
after the October 17, 2001 hearing because counsel for both parties had already interpreted 
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the November 22nd Order, both counsel had represented their understanding of the meaning 
of the November 22nd Order at the October 17, 2001 hearing, and Jorgensen waited a year 
after the October 17th hearing to lodge any contrary interpretation of the November 22, 
2000 Order. If this Court were to agree with parties like Jorgensen - i.e. that their in-court 
stipulations can be second-guessed years later when such parties have finally gotten around 
to analyzing their unfavorable stipulation, then every such in-court stipulation would be 
open to collateral attack years later. Trial courts could no longer rely on stipulations by 
counsel. Thus, Jorgensen's efforts to renege on his in-court stipulation would only serve to 
magnify litigation, greatly expand trial courts' work, and create a perverse incentive for 
stipulating parties to subsequently renege on their in-court stipulations based on later more 
favorable interpretations. 
Accordingly, the Trial Court properly relied on the parties' in-court stipulation and 
representations, thereby properly interpreting the November 22, 2000 Order. 
D. THE LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE PROPERLY APPLIES TO THE 
NOVEMBER 22, 2000 AND DECEMBER 12, 2001 ORDERS 
Jorgensen's final argument is that the "law of the case" doctrine is inapplicable 
because the sheep trespasses subject to the December 12, 2001 Order occurred prior to 
that date (i.e. on October 17, 2001 and November 22,2001). 
However, Jorgensen overlooks the fact that he and his attorney verbally stipulated 
and agreed on October 17, 2001 to a $25-per-sheep-per-day fine. Just because said 
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stipulation was not memorialized until the December 12, 2001 Order does not mean that 
the verbal in-court stipulation was of no effect until the December 12, 2001 Order. 
Jorgensen certainly provides no caselaw supporting such a novel theory which invalidates 
verbal in-court stipulations. To the contrary, abundant Utah caselaw validates verbal 
stipulations. See, e.g.. Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Svs.. Inc.. 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah 
App. 1993) (stating, where parties orally agree to a stipulation, "[i]t is of no legal 
consequence that the parties have not signed a settlement agreement''); Seventy-Three 
Thousand One Hundred Thirty Dollars United States. 31 P.3d at 514 (stating, "The State and 
counsel for Lachman signed a written stipulation after they arrived at an oral stipulation 
during the forfeiture hearing."); U.R.C.P. 38 (provides for stipulations "made in open court 
and entered in the record"). 
Jorgensen then argues that the law of the case doctrine is "not the final word" and 
that the Trial Court should have reversed itself according to an exception to the latw of the 
case doctrine, which is: under "exceptional circumstances," an issue should be reopened 
"when the trial court is convinced that its prior decision was clearly erroneous and would 
work a manifest injustice." Thurston v. Box Elder County. 892 P.2d 1034, 1039 (Utah 
1995) (citation omitted). Specifically, Jorgensen argues this "narrowly defined" exception 
applies because the Trial Court should have been convinced that its prior decision was 
clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice based on Jorgensen's current 
interpretation of the November 20,2000 order. Jorgensen then regurgitates his current 
8 
interpretation of the November 20, 2000 order. 
The first problem with this argument is that this issue is governed by the abuse of 
discretion standard of review. McKee v. Williams, 741 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah App. 1987) 
(holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reversing itself); Thurston, 892 
P.2d at 1039. Thus, for Jorgensen's argument that this narrowly defined exceptional 
circumstance exception to the law of the case doctrine to apply, this Court must find that 
the Trial Court abused its discretion in not reversing itself. 
Second, as established throughout the record below, the Trial Court repeatedly 
reaffirmed its December 12, 2001 Order interpreting the November 22, 2000 Order. 
Jorgensen fails to explain how the December 12,2001 Order was clearly erroneous when it 
was based on his in-court representation/stipulation to the Trial Court. Apparently 
Jorgensen would have this Court believe that the Trial Court clearly erred in relying on 
Jorgensen's representation/stipulation. Jorgensen would thus have trial courts across 
Utah ignore in-court stipulations by attorneys (especially when the client is present in 
court), skeptically view them as erroneous, and instead require full litigation and evidence 
to decide an issue in lieu of a bi-lateral stipulation. The disastrous affect to litigation and 
jurisprudence in general from Jorgensen's don't-believe-attorneys'-in-court-stipulations 
argument is self evident 
Finally, Jorgensen argues what could hypothetically happen if Mower were allowed 
to keep Jorgensen's sheep for three days (thereby charging Jorgensen $75 per sheep) and 
9 
then be able to sell Jorgensen's sheep. However, Jorgensen's doomsday argument is purely 
hypothetical and thus not ripe before this Court because no such thing ever happened. 
Jorgensen cites no fact in the record indicating that Mower kept Jorgensen's sheep for 
three days and then sold Jorgensen's sheep. Such simply never happened. Jorgensen thus 
requests an advisory opinion from this Court on how it would rule if Jorgensen were to be 
charged $75 per sheep (for the three days) and then lose the sheep if Mower were to sell 
them. It is axiomatic that such an advisory opinion would be improper. 
Accordingly, Jorgensen's law of the case argument is inapplicable to the present 
case. 
E. EITHER BECAUSE OF WAIVER OR LACHES, JORGENSEN SHOULD BE 
BARRED FROM DISPUTING THE NOVEMBER 11, 2000 AND DECEMBER 
12, 2001 ORDERS 
Jorgensen's appeal arguments urging this Court to set aside the per-sheep penalty in 
the Trial Court's November 11, 2000 and December 12, 2001 orders, and to re-interpret 
the November 11, 2000 Order, should be barred by the doctrines of laches or waiver. 
"Laches has two elements: (1) lack of diligence on the part of the claimant, and (2) 
an injury to the defendant because of the lack of diligence." Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah 
Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 731 (Utah 1990). And, "waiver is the 
intentional relinquishment of a known r ight . . . . there must be an existing right, benefit or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Westside Dixon 
Assocs. LLC v. Utah Power & Light Companv/Pacificorp. 44 P.3d 775, 780 (Utah 2002). 
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In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the parties stipulated in open court on 
October 17, 2001 to the $25-per-sheep-per-day fine for Jorgensen allowing his sheep to 
trespass onto Mower's land. Specifically, the judge asked Jorgensen's then-attorney, "Is 
there an order in the file, Mr. Harmon, that says pay $25.00 per sheep per day?" 
Jorgensen's attorney responded unequivocally, "Yes." [R at 453, 7:25-8:2] Based on that 
in-court stipulation, as well as other things, the Trial Court issued its December 12,2001 
Order which stated, "Pursuant to the November 22, 2000 Order, Plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment against Defendant in the amount of $25.00 per sheep per day the sheep are on 
Plaintiffs property for a total judgment amount of $3,675.00 on this occasion." [R at 
297.] 
Although Jorgensen claims he raised an objection to the December 12, 2001 Order 
with his December 26,2001 Objection to Proposed Judgment, said objection failed to 
object to the $25-per-sheep-per-day portion of the December 12, 2001 Order. [R at 239-
240.] In fact, it was not until Jorgensen's September 23, 2002 Motion to Set Aside that 
Jorgensen first disputed the $25-per-sheep-per-day fine in the December 12th Order. [R at 
260.] Jorgensen thus waited nine months before disputing the $25-per-sheep-per-day fine, 
and Jorgensen never appealed the Trial Court's denial of his motion to set aside.3 
3
 Jorgensen cites caselaw in support of his claim that the Trial Court improperly 
denied his December 26,2001 Objection to Proposed Judgment, and argues that just 
because the caption to said objection was improper, the Trial Court should have reviewed it 
as a Rule 52 or Rule 59 motion. However, such an issue is not properly on appeal. 
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In its November 17, 2004 Order on Order to Show Cause, the Trial Court accurately 
summarized Jorgensen's conduct in this action: "There is nothing in the file to indicate that 
any effective and timely action has ever been taken [by Jorgensen] to change those orders." 
[R at 375.] Thus, based on Jorgensen's lack of response to the November 22, 2000 and 
December 12,2001 orders, he has waived his right to dispute said orders because he has 
intentionally relinquished a known right. Alternately, his dispute with the two orders in 
question is barred due to his own latches - i.e. his lack of diligence and the resulting 
damage to Mower should the two orders be amended or set aside.4 
Accordingly, Jorgensen should not be able to dispute the $25-per-sheep fine in 
either of the two orders in question based on waiver and latches. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mower requests that this Court affirm the Trial Court's 
interpretation of the November 22, 2000 and December 12, 2001 orders. 
Nowhere in his Docketing Statement, or in the Statement of Issues in his appeal brief has 
Jorgensen given notice that this would be an issue on appeal. 
4
 Mower has relied on the two orders in question in pursuing his rights against 
Jorgensen's repeated trespasses. He has incurred thousands of dollars in attorney's fees 
and other costs. To invalidate the $25-per-day-per-sheep fine would undue all of Mower's 
work over the years, as well as eviscerate any deterrence effect that the orders might have. 
A $25-per-day fine, instead of a $25-per-sheep-per-day fine, would have absolutely no 
deterrent effect on Jorgensen, and would be more costly to enforce than would be 
worthwhile. 
12 
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HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C 
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EXHIBIT A 
WADE S. WINEGAR # 5561 
CHRISTOPHER S. CRUMP #7839 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
150 East 400 North 
Salem, Utah 84653 
Telephone (801) 423-2800 
Facsimile (801) 423-7210 
IN AND FOR THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. MOWER, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
NEIL JORGENSEN, dba SKYLINE SHEEP ] 
COMPANY, ; 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 980600364 
1 Judge David L. Mower 
A settlement was orally agreed upon by both parties at a hearing held before this Court on 
the 1st day of December, 1999. Based upon that settlement, and for good cause showing, the 
Court now adopts the following: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
ORDER 
Page 1 
Mower v Jorgensen 
1. That Defendant does not have an easement on the property that would allow him 
to take his sheep across Plaintiffs property. 
2. That Defendant shall not take his sheep across Plaintiffs property under any 
circumstance. 
3. That if stray sheep are found on Plaintiffs property, Plaintiff shall have the right 
to pen those sheep and hold them for a period of three (3) days. After the three (3) day period, 
Plaintiff will be able to sell the sheep. 
4. That Defendant shall be responsible for paying a Twenty-five Dollar ($25.00) per 
day fee for sheep that are penned after being found on Plaintiffs property. 
5. That there is a judicially created easement that does allow Defendant to cross 
Plaintiffs property, but only to access his joint interest in One Hundred and Twenty (120) Acres 
on the East side of Plaintiff s property. This easement shall not be expanded or changed from the 
original easement granted. This easement does not permit the Defendant to take sheep across the 
property. 
6. That this Court shall issue an immediate Temporary Restraining Order if it is 
found that Defendant's sheep are crossing onto Plaintiffs property. 
7. That Defendant shall agree to pay damages pursuant to a Temporary Restraining 
Order referenced in Paragraph 6. 
ORDER 
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8. That each party shall be responsible for their own attorney's fees. 
DATED and SIGNED this 1 ^ day of November, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
:T COURT JUDGE 
ORDER 
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Mower v. Jorgensen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the a day of November, 2000,1 caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER via first class mail, postage prepaid, on the following: 
Milton T. Harmon 
36 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 97 
Nephi,UT 84648 
ORDER 
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EXHIBIT B 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT MANT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FY 
THOMAS E. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
NEIL JORGENSEN, 
CASE NO. 980600364 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
Defendant. 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT MANTI COURT 
SANPETE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
MANTI, UTAH 84642 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
OCTOBER 17, 2001 
TRANSCRIBED BY: Joseph M. Liddell, CSR, RPR 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
MR. HARMON: Yeah. Other than 1 he -- I think that 
for Mr. Jorgensen, you may want to submit an affidavit. But 
whatever we would submit we can do within the next five days, 
Your Honor. We don't want to delay it. 
MR. MURDOCK: I guess my concern is if there is an 
affidavit that's submitted that disputes facts, then we've 
kind of wasted our time here because we'd end up having to put 
people on the stand to testify, wouldn't we? 
MR. HARMON: Yeah. Well, I — I don't think we're 
gonna dispute the fact that, ah -- what we want to say, for 
example, is that they say there was 111 head of sheep, but he 
wants to say there were 55 ewes and their lambs -- their 
sucking lambs. 
THE COURT: Oh, it's a problem with counting. 
MR. HARMON: And what constitutes a sheep. And, ah, 
then the one thing the affidavits don't say, but I think we've 
agreed on, is that when the large group of sheep went over on 
the property, they went through an existing fence. 
MR. MURDOCK: Well, I — I don't think we agree on 
that. I don't know how they got on the property. I don't 
think we really have any understanding of that, Your Honor. 
MR. HARMON: Anyway there was a fence there and 
that, ah, within 12 hours of Mr. Jorgensen being nollfied of 
the sheep being there, he was there and moved. 
THE COURT Is theie an order in Lhe file, Mr 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
Harmon, that says pay $25 per sheep per day? 
MR. HARMON: Yes. 
old. 
THE COURT: Ah, and that order's probably months 
MR. HARMON: It is. That came 
MR. MURDOCK: It's about a year old, I think, Your 
Honor. 
MR. HARMON: Okay. 
And I think that Mr. Jorgensen would like the Court 
to know what he's done in trying to control the situation. He 
modified his method of operating the sheep in a substantial 
and major way to try to prevent this from happening. 
THE COURT: But Mr. Murdock, that part doesn't make 
any difference to you. You're saying you want compliance with 
the order. 
MR. MURDOCK: Yeah. I think we1re to a point where 
we need to seek enforcement of it in order to hopefully ensure 
that the problem is corrected in the future. You know, if 
he's taken corrective measures, I think that's great. Urn, it 
doesn't appear they were that successful on these occasions 
anyway. 
And then my client indicates that the problems 
persisted and they haven't — (Inaudible) — until these 
occasions when they kinda had had it; so --
THE COURT: I found, over the years, that, ah, 
OFFTrTAT, CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
EXHIBIT C 
WADE S. WINEGAR #5561 
CHRISTOPHER S. CRUMP #7839 
SCOTT T.TEMBY #8081 
BRUCE R. MURDOCK #6948 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
150 East 400 North 
Salem, Utah 84653 
Telephone: 801-423-2800 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. MOWER, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
NEIL JORGENSEN, d/b/a SKYLINE ; 
SHEEP COMPANY, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER 
) Case No. 980600364 
1 Judge David L. Mower 
This matter came before the Court on an Order to Show Cause issued by the Court 
on August 28,2001, ordering Defendant Neil Jorgensen d/b/a Skyline Sheep Company to 
appear and show cause why judgment should not be entered against him in the amount of 
$3,675.00 pursuant to the Court's Order in this matter dated November 22,2000 and Plaintiffs 
allegations that Defendant has violated that Order. A hearing was held on the Order to Show 
Cause on October 17, 2001. Plaintiff was represented by Bruce R. Murdock and Defendant 
was represented by Milton Harmon. The parties stipulated to the facts as presented by the 
affidavits submitted by Plaintiff in support of its Motion for an Order to Show Cause. Defendant 
was given five days from the date of the hearing to submit an affidavit supporting his 
position on the matter. Five days passed and Defendant did not submit any document to the 
Court in support of his position. Therefore, based upon the affidavits submitted by Plaintiff and 
the stipulation of the parties at the October 17, 2001 hearing, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant violated the Court's November 22, 2000 Order in this matter by 
allowing his sheep to go onto Plaintiffs property. A total of 111 sheep were on Plaintiffs 
property on May 12,2001 for one day and a total of 18 sheep were on Plaintiffs property for two 
days beginning May 19, 2001, in violation of the Court's order. 
2. Pursuant to the November 22, 2000 Order, Plaintiff is entitled to judgment 
against Defendant in the amount of $25.00 per sheep per day the sheep are onPlaintiff s property 
for a total judgment amount of $3,675.00 on this occasion. 
DATED this J2_ day of November, 2001. U 
k 
BY THE COURT: PjX 
i ' Judicial District Court Judge ^ £ l i \ A ^ 
Approved as to form: 
Milton T. Harmon 
Attorney for Defendant 
/ ^ V s J /L^/UWV_ XIJJX^AJL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I sent by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order this _!__ day of November, 2001 to the following: 
Milton T. Harmon 
Attorney at Law 
36 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 97 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Annotto Yields 
'•AAL/J 
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EXHIBIT D 
WADE S. WINEGAR #5561 
CHRISTOPHER S. CRUMP #7839 
SCOTT T.TEMBY #8081 
BRUCE R. MURDOCK #6948 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
150 East 400 North 
Salem, Utah 84653 
Telephone: 801-423-2800 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. MOWER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ' 
NEIL JORGENSEN, d/b/a SKYLINE ; 
SHEEP COMPANY, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) JUDGMENT 
) Case No. 980600364 
I Judge David L. Mower 
Based on the Order to Show Cause heard in this matter on October 17, 2001 and 
the Order of the Court thereon dated December 12,2001, Judgment is entered against the 
Defendant Neil Jorgensen, d/b/a Skyline Sheep Company pursuant to the December 12, 2001 
Order. 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff 
does receive judgment against the Defendant in the sum of $3,675.00, with interest to accrue on 
the judgment at the rate of 7.34%, plus costs accruing after Judgment. 
DATED this %i day of "DpCfWftf ;g, , 200_\_-
BY THE COURT: 
/ • 
Sixth Judicial District Court Judge I 
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